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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael J. Tobak Jr. appeals from an order of the District 
Court dismissing his complaint against Kenneth S. Apfel, 
the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court's final order pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. Upon plenary review, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
As the District Court correctly explained, a claimant 
seeking disability benefits under Title II of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 401-433, begins the 
administrative process by filing a claim with the Social 
Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.900; see 
generally Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 101 (1977) 
(articulating general procedures). If the claim is denied, the 
claimant may petition for reconsideration within six months 
of the adverse determination. See 20 C.F.R.SS 404.907- 
404.908. If that petition is unsuccessful, the claimant may 
ask for an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ"), 42 U.S.C. S 405(b), and may seek 
discretionary review of an adverse decision of the ALJ from 
the Appeals Council, 20 C.F.R. SS 404.967-404.968. 
Further, S 205 of the Act authorizes federal judicial review 
of "any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 
made after a hearing to which [the claimant] was a party 
. . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 405(g) (1999).1 
 
Res judicata principles apply to administrative as well as 
judicial adjudications. United States v. Utah Constr. & 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The role of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in social 
security cases was transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security 
pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program 
Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, 
effective March 31, 1995. All references to the Secretary are equally 
applicable to the Commissioner. 
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Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966). However, res 
judicata may only be properly applied to preclude a 
subsequent claim for disability benefits where the "same" 
claimant has filed a previous application based on the 
"same" issues and where such prior determination has 
become final by virtue of administrative or judicial action. 
20 C.F.R. S 404.957(c)(1); Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 
691 (3d Cir. 1985). Further, even if res judicata may 
properly be applied, the Commissioner has discretion 
whether to reopen a prior disability benefits application for 
"good cause" within four years of the date of notice of the 
initial determination. 20 C.F.R. SS 404.988(b), 404.989. We 
have held that a reopening will be found when there is an 
administrative review of the entire record and a decision is 
reached on the merits of the claim. See Coup v. Heckler, 
834 F.2d 313, 317 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
II. 
 
Tobak first applied for social security benefits on 
November 30, 1992. He alleged disability due to back injury 
and hypertension beginning April 4, 1986. His application 
was denied on March 3, 1993, and Tobak did not appeal. 
On October 23, 1995, Tobak filed a second application for 
disability benefits, again alleging disability due to back 
injury and hypertension beginning April 4, 1986. That 
application too was denied, both initially and on 
reconsideration. Tobak then filed a request for a hearing 
before the ALJ, which was granted. After considering the 
evidence presented at the hearing, on May 14, 1997, the 
ALJ issued an order in which he found that Tobak was not 
disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tobak filed for 
review by the Appeals Council. On January 21, 1998, the 
Appeals Council notified Tobak of its grant of his request 
for review and of its intent to dismiss the request for a 
hearing before the ALJ based on the doctrine of res 
judicata. The Appeals Council provided Tobak with 30 days 
to respond to the notice. Tobak did not respond, and on 
April 9, 1998, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's 
decision and dismissed the request for a hearing. In its 
order, the Appeals Council explained that the doctrine of 
res judicata applied to the second application and that the 
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ALJ should have dismissed Tobak's request for a hearing 
on that ground. 
 
On June 8, 1998, Tobak filed this civil action against the 
Commissioner in the District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, seeking review of the Appeals Council's 
decision to dismiss his second claim based on the doctrine 
of res judicata. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. By order dated December 
29, 1998, the District Court granted the motion, holding 
that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S 405(g) to 
review the Appeals Council's discretionary dismissal of 
Tobak's application. See Tobak v. Apfel, No. 98-996 (W.D. 
Pa. Dec. 29, 1998). 
 
III. 
 
Federal court jurisdiction is expressly limited byS 205 of 
the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. S 405(g), (h). Section 
205(h) precludes judicial review of the "findings of fact or 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security . . . except 
as herein provided." 42 U.S.C. S 405(h). Section 205(g) 
provides for federal jurisdiction over "any final decision of 
the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing 
to which [the claimant] was a party, irrespective of the 
amount in controversy." 42 U.S.C. S 405(g). 
 
It is well settled that federal courts lack jurisdiction 
under S 205 to review the Commissioner's discretionary 
decision to decline to reopen a prior application or to deny 
a subsequent application on res judicata grounds. See 
Sanders, 430 U.S. at 107-09; Stauffer v. Califano, 693 F.2d 
306, 307 (3d Cir. 1982). As the Supreme Court explained in 
Sanders, because an administrative decision declining to 
reopen a prior claim or denying a subsequent claim on res 
judicata grounds does not require a hearing, it is not a 
"final decision . . . made after a hearing" as required for 
jurisdiction under S 205(g) of the Act. See Sanders, 430 
U.S. at 107-08. The Court has also held that federal courts 
do have jurisdiction to entertain constitutional questions, 
which are "unsuited to resolution in the administrative 
hearing procedures." Id. at 109. Although Tobak's 
complaint alleged violation of due process, he apparently 
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did not argue that claim before the District Court and does 
not argue it on appeal. 
 
Instead, Tobak relies on the undisputed proposition that 
federal courts also have jurisdiction to determine whether 
res judicata has been properly applied to bar the pending 
claim or whether, even though res judicata might properly 
have been applied, the prior claim has nevertheless been 
reopened. See McGowen v. Harris, 666 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 
1981). Tobak's principal argument is that the ALJ 
constructively reopened Tobak's prior application, and that 
the Appeals Council could not thereafter dismiss his claim 
on res judicata grounds. In other words, Tobak argues the 
Appeals Council improperly applied res judicata to Tobak's 
second application. We disagree. Even if the ALJ had 
reopened Tobak's prior claim,2 the Appeals Council had the 
authority to reverse the ALJ's decision. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.979 (empowering the Appeals Council to "adopt, 
modify or reject" the decision of the ALJ). The Appeals 
Council's unambiguous rejection of the ALJ's decision and 
the Council's dismissal of Tobak's second claim on res 
judicata grounds nullified the action of the ALJ. As the 
District Court correctly stated, "The ALJ's decision has 
been vacated, and, therefore, even if it had constituted a 
reopening of the application, it is no longer a decision 
which can be evaluated." Tobak v. Apfel, No. 98-996, at 8 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1998). 
 
This holding is in line with the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which 
have found in similar cases that the Appeals Council can 
dismiss a subsequent application on res judicata grounds 
even if an earlier decision of the ALJ expressly or 
constructively reopened the prior application. See Ellis v. 
Schweiker, 662 F.2d 419, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1981); Harper v. 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 978 F.2d 260, 
261-62 (6th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 974, 
975-76 (7th Cir. 1991). Moreover, contrary to Tobak's 
assertions, our decision in Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682 
(3d Cir. 1985), is consistent with this result. It is true that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Given our resolution of this case, we do not decide whether the ALJ 
constructively reopened the prior claim. 
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in Purter this court reversed the district court's application 
of res judicata to a disability claimant whose initial claim 
had been denied by the ALJ. We held that the ALJ had 
effectively reopened the case when it held a full hearing. 
However, as the District Court noted in its comprehensive 
opinion, in Purter neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council 
had discussed res judicata. Thus, the district court there 
had applied res judicata where the Secretary had not. In 
contrast, here the Appeals Council specifically found that 
Tobak's claim was barred by res judicata. We agree, 
therefore, that Purter is of limited application to the case 
before us. 
 
Tobak also argues that the District Court should have 
determined "whether the necessary elements of res judicata 
were present [and] whether the application of res judicata 
would be fair under the circumstances and in line with the 
beneficent purposes of the Social Security Act." Appellant 
Br. at 19. Tobak is correct that, as we noted above, the 
District Court had jurisdiction to determine whether res 
judicata was applicable in this case. He is mistaken, 
however, in his assertion that the District Court had 
jurisdiction to apply equitable administrative res judicata 
considerations. Those considerations are committed to the 
Commissioner's discretion in deciding whether to reopen a 
claim for "good cause," see 20 C.F.R.SS 404.988(b), 
404.989, and therefore are not reviewable by the federal 
courts, see Sanders, 430 U.S. at 107-08. 
 
We agree with the District Court's decision that res 
judicata applies in Tobak's case. Tobak's second application 
undisputedly involved the same injuries, the same dates, 
and the same issues as his first application. His prior 
application became final when he failed to pursue his 
administrative appeals from the denial of his application. 
Although Tobak did not have a hearing, that was because 
he waived his opportunity to request a hearing at that 
stage. Therefore, the absence of a hearing on his prior 
application does not affect the finality of that proceeding, 
nor does it affect our determination that res judicata was 
properly applied in this case. See Domozik v. Cohen, 413 
F.2d 5, 8 (3d Cir. 1969). The District Court properly held 
that it was without jurisdiction to review the 
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Commissioner's discretionary decision not to reopen 
Tobak's prior claim. For these reasons, we will affirm. 
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